In the latest episode of Defence Uncut, Bilal Khan and Arslan Khan break down two weeks of major developments across the Pakistan Armed Forces – from the commissioning of the Pakistan Navy’s first Hangor-class AIP submarine, to the Pakistan Army’s accelerating pivot towards precision fire and precision strike capabilities, the Army Rocket Force Command’s first training launch of the Fatah-II guided missile, and the completion of Pakistan’s electro-optical satellite constellation with the PRSC-EO3 launch.
The discussion also includes a retrospective on the Pakistan Navy’s surface fleet, the recent SMASH anti-ship ballistic missile test from a Babur-class corvette, the Taimoor anti-ship cruise missile test, and a wider conversation about where Pakistan’s munitions industry is heading in a shifting global order.
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PNS/M Hangor: Pakistan Navy Commissions Its First Hangor-Class AIP Submarine
The headline development is the commissioning of PNS/M Hangor, the lead boat of the Hangor-class (S26) submarine program – a derivative of China’s Yuan-class (Type 039B) platform equipped with a Stirling-cycle air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. The program, which dates back to a contract signed around 2015 for eight submarines, was one of the Pakistan Navy’s most tightly held procurement efforts – to the point where, as Arslan notes, many observers had questioned whether it would materialize at all following the collapse of the earlier Type 214 deal with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS).
That earlier program, valued at approximately 1.2 to 1.3 billion euros, fell apart between 2009 and 2010 due to a convergence of Pakistan’s fiscal crisis, the fallout of the Great Recession, and Germany’s reluctance to extend financing. Bilal traces the subsequent pivot to China – initially for six, then revised to eight S26 submarines – and the technical trade-offs involved, particularly around the AIP architecture. The Stirling-cycle system introduces more dynamic moving parts than the fuel-cell AIP that would have accompanied the Type 214, creating a potential acoustic exposure risk in the warmer waters of the Arabian Sea. However, the Hangor’s double-hull design appears to compensate for this through improved acoustic control.
Of the eight boats on order, four are being built at Wuchang Shipyard in China – all are reportedly in the final stages of handover, with sea trials underway – while the remaining four are to be constructed at Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW). Progress on the Pakistani-built boats has been slower, a recurring consequence of funding constraints. However, once complete, the Hangor fleet will more than triple the Pakistan Navy’s AIP-equipped submarine force from three Agosta 90B boats to eleven platforms in total.
The episode explores the strategic rationale behind the Hangor-class. Unlike the smaller coastal-defence submarines the Pakistan Navy has historically operated, the Hangor-class is designed for forward-deployed, long-endurance operations – covering sea lines of communication across the Arabian Sea, operating towards the Gulf, and extending the Pakistan Navy’s coverage net into the broader Indian Ocean region. The Pakistan Navy’s dual-submarine strategy envisions the Hangor fleet handling deep-water offensive roles while a forthcoming shallow-water attack submarine (SWATS) program – potentially based on Italy’s Fincantieri S800 platform – addresses the coastal anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) layer.
Pakistan Navy Surface Fleet: The Armament Debate Around the Babur-Class and Jinnah-Class
The episode devotes significant time to the ongoing criticism around the armament configuration of the Pakistan Navy’s newer surface combatants – specifically the Babur-class corvettes (modified Ada-class MILGEM from Turkiye) and the forthcoming Jinnah-class frigates.
Arslan unpacks the supply-side constraints that have shaped these ships’ weapons fit. The vertical launch system (VLS) options available to the Pakistan Navy were severely limited: the Mark 41/EXLS family was not exportable to Pakistan, France’s SYLVER was unavailable, and the Turkish MIDLAS system was not ready at the time of design. The only viable option was the Chinese AJK-16 cold-launch cell – a single-missile-per-cell system that constrains the total missile load without significant hull modifications. Adding more VLS cells would require lengthening the hull, triggering design changes and cost increases the Pakistan Navy could not absorb.
On the anti-ship missile question, Arslan raises a more pointed concern: the equipping of SMASH – the navalized Fatah-II anti-ship ballistic missile – on surface combatants. The SMASH, derived from the same Fatah-II core platform used by the Army, is significantly heavier than conventional anti-ship cruise missiles like the C-802. Drawing parallels with the Type 054A/P’s four CM-302 supersonic missiles – where the weight differential limited the load to half that of the C-802 configuration – Arslan suggests the Babur-class may end up carrying very few SMASH rounds, potentially as few as four.
Bilal suggests the Pakistan Navy’s approach to ship-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles might be better suited to shore-based coastal defence batteries rather than surface combatants. He also points to the emerging Rasoob 250 program – a lightweight, stealthy cruise missile analogous to the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) – as a potentially more appropriate fit for the Jinnah-class frigate’s midlife configuration, offering 12 to 16 rounds in a form factor the ship can sustain. The broader argument is that Pakistan’s surface fleet has always been viewed primarily as a peacetime deterrence and diplomatic presence asset – not the centrepiece of wartime naval operations, which the Pakistan Navy has consistently reserved for its submarine force.