（下边有中文翻译请继续看到底。 谢谢。）
For the past several weeks, the possibility of a military attack on Iran has dominated political debate, media coverage, and strategic calculations across West Asia. Whether such an attack has been delayed, postponed, or quietly shelved remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that any military action against Iran—by Israel, the United States, or both—would not be a limited or contained event. It would unleash consequences that would engulf the entire region, destabilize global markets, and further fracture an already fragile international order.
An attack on Iran would not merely target a single country; it would trigger political unrest, economic shocks, soaring oil prices, disrupted trade routes, and a sharp rise in regional militancy and terrorism. For countries across the Middle East and South Asia, such a conflict would amount to a living nightmare—one whose costs would far outweigh any perceived strategic gains.
A Changed Iran, A Changed Region
One of the most dangerous miscalculations policymakers could make is to assume that today’s Iran resembles the Iran of mid-2025 or earlier. It does not. Iran has drawn lessons from recent conflicts, internal crises, and external pressure. It is militarily more prepared, diplomatically more connected, and strategically more cautious—but also more capable of retaliation.
While Israeli and U.S. military power unquestionably surpasses Iran’s in conventional terms, warfare in today’s Middle East is no longer decided by sheer firepower alone. Iran’s deterrence strategy is built on layered retaliation: missiles, drones, cyber capabilities, maritime leverage, and regional allies. Any strike on Iranian territory would almost certainly be met with a wider and more forceful response than many in Washington or Tel Aviv may anticipate.
More importantly, the regional political environment has fundamentally changed. Unlike in past decades, no major regional country appears willing to provide airspace, logistical corridors, or political cover for an attack on Iran. The era when U.S. military operations could rely on near-automatic regional cooperation is fading fast.
Regional Reluctance and Rising Anti-U.S. Sentiments
Across the Middle East, governments are increasingly wary of becoming entangled in another large-scale conflict. Gulf states, already navigating economic diversification, energy transitions, and domestic reforms, fear that war with Iran would directly threaten their stability, infrastructure, and long-term development plans.
Public opinion has also shifted sharply. Anti-U.S. sentiments in the region have reached levels not seen in years, driven by prolonged conflicts, humanitarian crises, and perceptions of selective international morality. Any government openly supporting an attack on Iran would face severe domestic backlash and regional isolation.
This reluctance severely limits operational feasibility. Without regional airspace access, forward logistics, and political backing, even the most powerful militaries face serious constraints. War planning cannot ignore geography—and geography is no longer cooperative.
U.S. Strategic Overstretch
At the global level, the United States is confronting an undeniable reality: strategic overextension. Washington is already deeply engaged on multiple fronts. From Venezuela to renewed tensions over Greenland, from commitments in Europe to the Indo-Pacific, U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic bandwidth is stretched thin.
This over-engagement weakens U.S. capabilities to initiate and sustain another major conflict—especially one as complex and unpredictable as a war with Iran. The U.S. economy, though resilient, is not immune to prolonged instability, inflationary pressures, and energy market shocks. A spike in oil prices following any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would hit U.S. consumers and global markets almost immediately.
Furthermore, U.S. relations with its traditional allies are not as solid as they once were. Growing policy differences with the European Union and internal strains within NATO mean that Washington cannot count on unconditional Western unity. Many European states, still grappling with economic pressures and security fatigue, are unlikely to support another Middle Eastern war.
Domestic Politics: A Powerful Restraint
Domestic political realities in both the United States and Israel are acting as powerful brakes on military adventurism.
In the U.S., President Donald Trump faces intense scrutiny ahead of the November mid-term elections. Public appetite for another overseas conflict is low, and bipartisan skepticism about unilateral military action is growing. Large-scale protests, political polarization, and economic anxieties make war a politically risky proposition.
In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is confronting his own political storm. With general elections scheduled for October, deep internal divisions, sustained public protests, and growing criticism over governance and security priorities, Netanyahu’s room for maneuver is limited. A prolonged or inconclusive conflict with Iran could prove politically disastrous rather than advantageous.
History shows that leaders under domestic pressure sometimes seek external confrontation—but it also shows that such gambles often backfire.
The Multipolar Reality: Russia and China Will Not Stay Silent
Perhaps the most significant change in the global landscape is the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world. The United States no longer operates in an uncontested strategic environment.
Russia and China have both deepened their political, economic, and diplomatic engagement in the Middle East. Iran occupies a critical position in this evolving order. Any attack on Iran would not occur in isolation; it would reverberate through great-power politics.
While neither Moscow nor Beijing may seek direct military confrontation with the United States, both possess ample means to complicate, counterbalance, and diplomatically challenge U.S. actions. From the United Nations to energy markets and regional mediation efforts, their influence would be felt immediately.
For China and Russia, an attack on Iran could also be seen as an opportunity to fill the power vacuum created by perceived U.S. recklessness—strengthening their roles as alternative partners and security brokers in the region.
Economic Fallout and Global Shockwaves
Ivan Timofeev:
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The economic consequences of a war with Iran would be severe and immediate. Iran sits at the heart of one of the world’s most vital energy corridors. Any disruption to oil and gas flows would drive prices sharply upward, fueling inflation across Asia, Europe, and North America.
Global trade routes would face new risks, insurance costs would surge, and fragile post-pandemic supply chains could fracture again. Developing economies, already under strain, would bear the heaviest burden.
For a global economy struggling to maintain stability, this is a risk few policymakers can justify.
A War Without a Clear Endgame
Perhaps the most compelling argument against attacking Iran is the absence of a credible endgame. Even a successful initial strike would not eliminate Iran’s strategic capabilities or regional influence. Instead, it would likely lock the region into a prolonged cycle of retaliation, proxy conflict, and instability.
Iran’s ability to respond asymmetrically—through regional allies, maritime pressure, and non-traditional warfare—means that escalation would be difficult to control. What begins as a “limited” strike could quickly spiral into a multi-front confrontation.
Restraint Is Not Weakness
The delay or hesitation surrounding an attack on Iran should not be interpreted as indecision or weakness. Rather, it reflects a sober recognition of reality. The strategic, political, economic, and diplomatic costs of war far exceed its uncertain benefits.
In today’s interconnected and multipolar world, brute force no longer guarantees outcomes. Dialogue, deterrence, and regional diplomacy—however imperfect—remain the only viable paths to stability.
An attack on Iran would not bring security to the Middle East; it would bring chaos. Increasingly, leaders across the world appear to understand that some wars, once started, cannot be controlled—and cannot be won.
对伊朗的攻击：美国无法承受的冒险之举
在过去几周里，对伊朗可能发动军事攻击的讨论主导了西亚的政治辩论、媒体报道和战略计算。目前尚不清楚此类攻击是否被推迟、延期，或已悄然搁置。但可以确定的是，任何针对伊朗的军事行动——无论是以色列、美国，还是两者联合——都不会是有限或可控的事件。它将释放影响，席卷整个地区，扰乱全球市场，并进一步撕裂原本脆弱的国际秩序。
对伊朗的攻击不仅仅是针对一个国家；它将引发政治动荡、经济冲击、油价飙升、贸易线路中断，以及地区恐怖主义和武装冲突的急剧上升。对于中东和南亚各国来说，这种冲突几乎是噩梦般的存在，其代价远远超过任何所谓的战略收益。
一个变化了的伊朗，一个变化了的地区
政策制定者最危险的误判之一是认为今天的伊朗仍然像2025年中期或更早的伊朗。事实并非如此。伊朗从近期冲突、国内危机以及外部压力中吸取了教训。它在军事上更为准备充分，在外交上联系更广，在战略上更为谨慎——同时也更具报复能力。
虽然以色列和美国的常规军事力量无疑超过伊朗，但当今中东的战争已不再仅仅由火力决定。伊朗的威慑战略建立在多层次报复能力上：导弹、无人机、网络能力、海上影响力以及地区盟友。任何针对伊朗领土的打击几乎肯定会遭到比华盛顿或特拉维夫预期更大规模、更强烈的回应。
更重要的是，地区政治环境已发生根本性变化。与过去几十年不同，如今没有任何主要地区国家愿意为攻击伊朗提供空域、后勤通道或政治掩护。美国军事行动几乎自动获得地区合作的时代正在快速消退。
地区不情愿与反美情绪上升
中东各国政府越来越谨慎，不愿卷入又一场大规模冲突。海湾国家在经济多元化、能源转型和国内改革中，担心与伊朗开战将直接威胁其稳定、基础设施及长期发展计划。
公众舆论也发生了明显变化。中东地区的反美情绪达到多年未见的高位，源于长期冲突、人道主义危机以及对国际道德选择性的感知。任何政府若公开支持攻击伊朗，都将面临国内强烈反弹和地区孤立。
这种不情愿严重限制了作战可行性。没有地区空域访问、前沿后勤支持和政治支持，即便是最强大的军队也将面临严重制约。战争规划不能忽视地理——而地理不再配合。
美国的战略过度扩张
在全球层面，美国面临一个不可否认的现实：战略过度扩张。华盛顿已在多条战线深度介入：从委内瑞拉到格陵兰紧张局势，从欧洲承诺到印太事务，美国的军事、外交和经济资源已经紧绷。
这种过度参与削弱了美国发起和维持另一场重大冲突的能力——尤其是像伊朗战争这样复杂且不可预测的冲突。尽管美国经济具有韧性，但也无法完全免受长期不稳定、通胀压力和能源市场冲击的影响。霍尔木兹海峡一旦发生供应中断，油价飙升将立即冲击美国消费者和全球市场。
此外，美国与传统盟友的关系不再稳固。与欧盟的政策分歧加大，以及北约内部压力，意味着华盛顿无法指望无条件的西方团结。许多欧洲国家仍在应对经济压力和安全疲劳，不太可能支持另一场中东战争。
国内政治：强有力的制约
美国和以色列的国内政治现实正在对军事冒险形成强有力制约。
在美国，总统特朗普面临11月中期选举前的严密审查。公众对海外冲突的兴趣低，而两党对单方面军事行动的怀疑正在增加。大规模抗议、政治极化和经济焦虑，使战争在政治上成为高风险选择。
在以色列，内塔尼亚胡总理面临自己的政治风暴。10月的全国大选将至，国内分歧严重，持续的公众抗议以及对治理和安全优先事项的批评不断增长，使得内塔尼亚胡的操作空间受限。与伊朗的长期或无结论冲突可能政治上灾难性，而非有利。
历史表明，在国内压力下，领导人有时会寻求外部对抗——但历史同样显示，这类赌博往往适得其反。
多极现实：俄罗斯与中国不会保持沉默
全球格局的最大变化或许是由单极向多极的过渡。美国不再处于无可争议的战略环境中。
俄罗斯和中国都加深了在中东的政治、经济和外交参与。伊朗在这一演变秩序中占据关键位置。任何对伊朗的攻击都不会孤立发生，而将通过大国政治产生连锁反应。
虽然莫斯科和北京可能不寻求与美国直接军事对抗，但两国完全有能力使美国行动复杂化、形成制衡并在外交上提出挑战。从联合国到能源市场，再到地区调解，其影响将立即显现。
对中国和俄罗斯而言，对伊朗的攻击也可能被视为填补美国鲁莽留下的权力真空的机会——强化其作为地区替代伙伴和安全仲裁者的角色。
经济后果与全球冲击
对伊朗开战的经济后果将立即而严重。伊朗位于全球最重要的能源通道核心。任何油气流动中断都将推动油价急剧上升，引发亚洲、欧洲和北美的通胀。
全球贸易路线将面临新风险，保险成本飙升，疫情后脆弱的供应链可能再次断裂。经济脆弱的发展中国家将承受最沉重的负担。
对于努力维持稳定的全球经济，这是极少数决策者可以承担的风险。
没有明确终局的战争
反对攻击伊朗的最有力论据或许是缺乏可信的终局。即便初次打击成功，也无法消除伊朗的战略能力或地区影响力。相反，这可能将该地区锁定在报复、代理冲突和不稳定的长期循环中。
伊朗通过地区盟友、海上压力和非传统战争进行非对称回应的能力意味着升级将难以控制。所谓的“有限”打击可能迅速演变成多线冲突。
克制并非软弱
对伊朗攻击的延迟或犹豫不应被解读为犹豫或软弱。它反映的是对现实的清醒认知。战争的战略、政治、经济和外交代价远远超过其不确定收益。
在当今互联互通、多极化的世界里，武力已无法保证结果。对话、威慑与地区外交——尽管不完美——仍是唯一可行的稳定途径。
对伊朗的攻击不会给中东带来安全，而只会带来混乱。越来越多的世界领导人似乎明白，有些战争一旦开始，就无法控制，也无法赢得。
( 注意： 本文是用AI翻译的，或有误差。请以原版英文为准。谢谢。)
Reference Link:- https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/attack-on-iran-a-gamble-that-u-s-cannot-afford-/