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President Donald Trump’s recent statement that the United States will restart nuclear-weapons testing marks one of the most important policy shifts in global security since the end of the Cold War. 唐纳德·特朗普总统最近表示，美国将重启核武器试验，这是冷战结束以来全球安全领域最重要的政策转变之一。
President Donald Trump’s recent statement that the United States will restart nuclear weapons testing marks one of the most important policy shifts in global security since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has not conducted a full-scale nuclear explosion since 1992, when Washington, Moscow, and Beijing—despite their political differences—fell into an informal rhythm of limits. For more than three decades, this suspension helped slow the pace of the nuclear arms race, eased environmental concerns, and encouraged multilateral arms-control agreements.
Yet, in a brief but startling announcement ahead of his meeting with President Xi Jinping, President Trump declared that the Pentagon would begin nuclear testing “on an equal basis” with Russia and China. The move, he argued, was necessary to match Moscow’s fresh missile demonstrations and what he described as Beijing’s expanding and impervious nuclear activities. By placing the initiative straight in America’s hands, Trump suggested that the burden of the curb should now shift to the other two major nuclear powers.
The declaration has promptly set off alarms—not only in foreign capitals, but also in Washington’s own policy spheres. Supporters, such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Jim Risch, have admired the decision as a “reasonable” response to the evolving nuclear posture of enemies. Critics, including senior Democrat Jack Reed, warn that restarting nuclear testing risks unraveling decades of painstaking non-proliferation progress and could trigger a new global nuclear arms competition. Both sides acknowledge, however, that the consequences of such a move could be far-reaching.
A Look Back: The History of Nuclear Testing
Nuclear testing has designed the modern world in ways few other technological developments have. The first nuclear explosion—the 1945 Trinity Test in New Mexico—steered humanity into the atomic era. Over the following decades, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China conducted hundreds of tests, often in remote deserts, islands, and oceans. Each test helped improve weapon designs, develop new delivery systems, and demonstrate geopolitical strength. But the costs were enormous: radioactive contamination, environmental devastation, displacement of local populations, and long-term health effects on unknowingly exposed communities.
Public pressure against testing steadily grew throughout the 1960s, and limited agreements began to emerge. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty banned atmospheric, underwater, and outer-space tests but allowed underground tests to continue. It was not until the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, that a broader global consensus began to form around ending nuclear explosions overall. This led to the creation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)—a milestone pact meant to stop nuclear weapons development at its roots.
The CTBT: A Cornerstone of Global Restraint
Adopted by the United Nations in 1996, the CTBT is designed to ban all nuclear explosions—whether underground, underwater, or atmospheric, whether for military or so-called “peaceful” purposes. Today, 187 countries have signed the treaty, and 185 have ratified it, making it one of the world’s most widely supported non-proliferation instruments.
But here lies the problem: the treaty has still not entered into legal force.
For that to happen, only 44 states listed in the treaty—countries with nuclear weapons or nuclear technology at the time—must endorse it. Eight still have not: the United States, China, Iran, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. As long as even one of these states refuses to ratify, the treaty remains a powerful symbol—but not a compulsory legal barrier.
Despite this lag, the CTBT has formed meaningful global norms. It established an extraordinary International Monitoring System (IMS) of 337 stations using seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide sensors to detect even the smallest nuclear explosion. The system has worked effectively, identifying all of North Korea’s nuclear tests, including those conducted as recently as 2017.
The CTBT’s broader purpose is clear:
· to stop the improvement of nuclear weapons,
· to prevent new nuclear powers from evolving,
· and to foster a world where nuclear weapons become less credible and less usable.
It is fair to say that for nearly 30 years, the CTBT has helped keep the nuclear genie partially inside the bottle.
A New Arms Race? The Risks Are Real
The danger of the U.S. recommencing nuclear tests is not limited to the tests themselves. The larger risk is what comes next.
If Washington breaks the decades-long moratorium, it almost guarantees that Moscow and Beijing will respond, either through their own tests or augmented weapons development. Other nuclear states—particularly India and Pakistan—may see it as a strategic requirement to resume their own testing actions. This cascading outcome is the nightmare scenario non-proliferation advocates have long warned against: a global nuclear arms race in the 21st century, at a time when humanity faces extraordinary challenges like climate change, pandemics, and economic volatility.
India and Pakistan: A Particularly Fragile Equation
South Asia is home to two nuclear-armed adversaries whose relationship is shaped by mistrust, land disputes, and historical grievances. India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, calling them crucial for national security. Pakistan responded within weeks with its own tests, arguing that it had no choice but to reestablish strategic balance.
If the United States resumes nuclear testing now, it may encourage India—already pursuing an ambitious military modernization program—to resume its own testing cycle. India’s desire for thermonuclear enhancement and more advanced warheads is well known. Any such move by New Delhi would certainly provoke a response from Pakistan, which cannot afford to fall behind in deterrence capabilities.
But unlike the superpowers, India and Pakistan both face severe structural liabilities.
They struggle with:
· climate change and water shortage,
· economic stagnation,
· high poverty rates,
· public-sector underinvestment,
· and friable social infrastructures.
A nuclear arms race in South Asia would distract precious resources away from education, healthcare, climate adaptation, and poverty reduction. The real victims would be the people, ordinary citizens who bear the burden of policy decisions made far above their heads.
Even a minor military escalation between the two countries could twist unpredictably, given their short missile flight times and explosive political environments. A major conflict would be catastrophic not only for the region but for the whole world.
The Humanitarian Cost of Nuclear Brinkmanship
Nuclear weapons are often discussed in intellectual terms—megaton yields, delivery systems, strategic doctrines. But their true impact is devastatingly human. The hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the victims of atmospheric testing in the Pacific, and the residents of Semipalatinsk and Nevada—all help as reminders that nuclear explosions leave behind generations of suffering.
In any future nuclear exchange, the immediate deaths would be only a fraction of the total toll. Long-term cancers, genetic mutations, economic collapse, forced migrations, and the collapse of public services would haunt societies for decades. A nuclear winter scenario could destroy agriculture worldwide, plunging millions into starvation.
Seen in this light, resuming nuclear testing is not merely a strategic maneuver; it is a step toward normalizing weapons capable of ending human civilization.
A Moment for Leadership, Not Escalation
The world today is more interrelated, more brittle, and more aware of existential risks than ever previously. Reviving nuclear testing looms to undo decades of progress in building global rules against the use and expansion of nuclear arms. Instead of re-entering an era of nuclear strategy, this moment calls for leadership that prioritizes dialogue, curbs, and the consolidation of international treaties like the CTBT.
If the United States, Russia, and China commit to renewed diplomacy—rather than reciprocal escalation—the CTBT could finally move toward universal endorsement. If India and Pakistan resist the temptation to chase new nuclear capabilities, the region could refocus on the real threats facing their populations: extreme weather, hunger, water scarcity, unemployment, and inflation.
The world already has enough nuclear weapons to destroy itself many times over. What humanity needs now is not more explosions underground, but more cooperation above ground.
We stand at a junction. One path leads us back to the darkest chapters of the 20th century. The other leads toward a safer, more stable, more humane world. The choice belongs to today’s leaders—but its consequences will be borne by future generations.
恢复核试验可能引发全球军备竞赛
唐纳德·特朗普总统最近表示，美国将重启核武器试验，这是冷战结束以来全球安全领域最重要的政策转变之一。美国自1992年以来没有进行过全面的核爆炸，当时华盛顿、莫斯科和北京——尽管他们的政治分歧——陷入了一种非正式的限制节奏。在三十多年的时间里，这一暂停帮助减缓了核军备竞赛的步伐，缓解了对环境的担忧，并鼓励了多边军备控制协议。
他辩称，此举是必要的，以配合莫斯科最新的导弹演示，以及他所称的北京不断扩大且不受影响的核活动。通过将主动权直接交到美国手中，特朗普暗示，遏制的负担现在应该转移到另外两个主要核大国身上。
这一声明迅速拉响了警报——不仅在外国首都，而且在华盛顿自己的政策领域。参议院外交关系委员会主席吉姆•里施（Jim Risch）等支持者赞赏这一决定，认为这是对敌人不断演变的核态势的“合理”回应。包括资深民主党人杰克•里德（Jack Reed）在内的批评人士警告称，重启核试验可能会破坏数十年来艰苦努力取得的防扩散进展，并可能引发新的全球核武器竞赛。然而，双方都承认，此举的后果可能是深远的。
回顾：核试验的历史
核试验对现代世界的影响是其他技术发展所无法比拟的。第一次核爆炸——1945年在新墨西哥州进行的三位一体试验——将人类带入了原子时代。在接下来的几十年里，美国、苏联、英国、法国和中国进行了数百次试验，通常是在偏远的沙漠、岛屿和海洋进行的。每次测试都有助于改进武器设计，开发新的发射系统，并展示地缘政治实力。但代价是巨大的：放射性污染、环境破坏、当地居民流离失所，以及对不知情的受辐射社区的长期健康影响。
整个20世纪60年代，反对核试验的公众压力稳步增长，有限的协议开始出现。1963年的《部分禁止核试验条约》禁止大气层、水下和外层空间试验，但允许地下试验继续进行。直到上世纪90年代冷战结束后，全球才开始就全面结束核爆炸达成更广泛的共识。这导致了《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT）的诞生，这是一个里程碑式的条约，旨在从根本上阻止核武器的发展。
《全面禁试条约》：全球克制的基石
《全面禁止核试验条约》于1996年由联合国通过，旨在禁止一切核爆炸——无论是地下、水下还是大气核爆炸，无论是用于军事目的还是所谓的“和平”目的。今天，187个国家签署了该条约，185个国家批准了该条约，使其成为世界上得到最广泛支持的不扩散文书之一。
但问题在于：该条约仍未具有法律效力。
要实现这一目标，条约中列出的44个国家——当时拥有核武器或核技术的国家——必须签署该条约。8个国家仍然没有：美国、中国、伊朗、以色列、埃及、印度、巴基斯坦和朝鲜。只要这些国家中有一个拒绝批准，该条约仍然是一个强有力的象征，但不是一个强制性的法律障碍。
尽管存在这种滞后，《全面禁试条约》已经形成了有意义的全球规范。它建立了一个非同寻常的由337个站点组成的国际监测系统（IMS），使用地震、水声、次声和放射性核素传感器来探测即使是最小的核爆炸。该系统有效地识别了朝鲜的所有核试验，包括最近在2017年进行的核试验。
《全面禁试条约》更广泛的目的是明确的：
·停止改进核武器；
·防止新的核大国发展，
·营造一个核武器变得更不可信、更不可用的世界。
公平地说，近30年来，《全面禁止核试验条约》帮助把核精灵部分地关在了瓶子里。
新一轮军备竞赛？风险是真实的
美国重启核试验的危险并不局限于核试验本身。更大的风险在于接下来会发生什么。
如果华盛顿打破长达数十年的暂停，几乎可以肯定莫斯科和北京会做出回应，要么通过自己的试验，要么通过增强武器开发。其他核国家——尤其是印度和巴基斯坦——可能会将其视为重启核试验的战略要求。这一连串的结果是不扩散倡导者长期警告的噩梦：在人类面临气候变化、流行病和经济波动等非同寻常的挑战之际，21世纪出现全球核军备竞赛。
印度和巴基斯坦：一个特别脆弱的等式
南亚是两个拥有核武器的对手的家园，它们的关系受到不信任、土地争端和历史恩怨的影响。印度在1998年进行了核试验，称其对国家安全至关重要。巴基斯坦在几周内以自己的试验作为回应，辩称它别无选择，只能重建战略平衡。
如果美国现在恢复核试验，它可能会鼓励已经在追求雄心勃勃的军事现代化计划的印度恢复自己的测试周期。众所周知，印度渴望增强热核和更先进的弹头。新德里的任何此类举动肯定会引起巴基斯坦的回应，巴基斯坦承受不起威慑能力落后的后果。
但与超级大国不同的是，印度和巴基斯坦都面临着严重的结构性债务。
他们挣扎于：
·气候变化和水资源短缺；
·经济停滞；
·高贫困率；
·公共部门投资不足；
·脆弱的社会基础设施。
南亚的核军备竞赛将分散用于教育、医疗、气候适应和减贫的宝贵资源。真正的受害者将是人民——承担着远远超出他们头顶的决策负担的普通公民。
考虑到两国的导弹飞行时间短，政治环境多变，两国之间即使是轻微的军事升级也可能出现不可预测的转折。一场重大冲突不仅对该地区，而且对整个世界都是灾难性的。
核边缘政策的人道主义代价
核武器经常被用智力术语来讨论——百万吨当量、运载系统、战略理论。但它们真正的影响是毁灭性的。广岛和长崎的被爆者，太平洋大气层核试验的受害者，以及塞米巴拉金斯克和内华达的居民——所有这些都提醒人们，核爆炸留下了几代人的痛苦。
在未来的任何核冲突中，直接的死亡只是总伤亡的一小部分。长期癌症、基因突变、经济崩溃、被迫移民和公共服务崩溃将困扰社会数十年。核冬天的情景可能摧毁全球农业，使数百万人陷入饥饿。
从这个角度来看，恢复核试验不仅仅是一种战略行动；这是朝着能够终结人类文明的武器正常化迈出的一步。
领导的时刻，而不是升级
当今世界比以往任何时候都更加相互关联，更加脆弱，也更加意识到存在的风险。恢复核试验将使数十年来在建立禁止使用和扩大核武器的全球规则方面取得的进展化为泡天开。这一时刻需要的不是重新进入核战略时代，而是优先考虑对话、限制和巩固《全面禁止核试验条约》等国际条约的领导作用。
如果美国、俄罗斯和中国致力于恢复外交关系，而不是相互升级，《全面禁止核试验条约》最终可能会得到普遍认可。如果印度和巴基斯坦抵制住追求新核能力的诱惑，该地区可以重新关注其人民面临的真正威胁：极端天气、饥饿、缺水、失业和通货膨胀。
世界上已经有足够的核武器来多次毁灭自己。人类现在需要的不是更多的地下爆炸，而是更多的地面合作。
我们站在一个十字路口。一条路将我们带回到20世纪最黑暗的篇章。另一条路通向一个更安全、更稳定、更人道的世界。这个选择属于今天的领导人，但其后果将由子孙后代承担。
( 注意： 本文是用AI翻译的，或有误差。请以原版英文为准。谢谢。)
Reference Link:- https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/11/15/resuming-nuclear-tests-risks-a-global-arms-race/