金砖国家机制2026：强大的合作平台，但约束性落实仍然不足
(下边有中文翻译，请继续看到底。 谢谢。）
The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi was impressive in scale, symbolism, and diplomatic visibility. Yet beneath the carefully managed language of solidarity lies a more difficult question: can an increasingly diverse BRICS convert political declarations into practical collective action? The answer after the 2026 summit remains uncertain.
BRICS now represents 11 countries, roughly half the world’s population and about 40 percent of global GDP at purchasing-power parity. Its growing economic weight is undeniable. But its expansion has also exposed profound differences in security interests, foreign policy and economic priorities.
The Middle East crisis provided the clearest test. Iran, a BRICS member, is directly involved in the current confrontation with the United States and Israel, while the Strait of Hormuz has become a major source of international concern. Yet the New Delhi Declaration stopped short of naming the principal parties to the conflict, calling instead for “maximum restraint” and dialogue. This caution is understandable: BRICS includes countries with sharply different relationships with Washington, Tehran and each other. But it also illustrates the bloc’s fundamental limitation. BRICS can issue political appeals, but it cannot function as a collective security organization.
The Iran-UAE relationship further demonstrates this problem. Tehran and Abu Dhabi have sharply different positions regarding the current regional conflict and maritime security. Negotiators reportedly had to bridge disagreements over how the West Asia conflict should appear in the final declaration. The UAE itself has publicly accused Iran of disrupting maritime routes and described the de facto closure of Hormuz as a threat to global energy security. Such differences make a unified geopolitical response extremely difficult.
The same caution applies to de-dollarisation. BRICS has made meaningful progress toward greater use of national currencies and cross-border payment cooperation, but the summit did not produce a common currency, binding timetable or monetary treaty. The emphasis remains on exploring payment connectivity, local-currency settlement and financial infrastructure. That is progress, but it is incremental rather than revolutionary.
Expansion has therefore become both BRICS’s strength and its weakness. Bringing in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Indonesia has given the organization greater geographical reach. But these states have different alliances, economic structures and regional conflicts. Consensus consequently requires carefully negotiated language rather than bold common policy.
Economic contradictions are equally visible. The declaration simultaneously recognizes the continuing importance of fossil fuels and calls for an orderly and equitable energy transition. This is not necessarily hypocrisy: developing economies genuinely face different energy circumstances. Nevertheless, the wording reflects the difficulty of reconciling the priorities of hydrocarbon producers with countries seeking rapid decarbonisation.
India occupies perhaps the most interesting position. Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted leaders including Vladimir Putin, Masoud Pezeshkian and Xi Jinping while maintaining India’s extensive strategic relationship with the United States and other Western partners. New Delhi therefore demonstrates that BRICS membership does not require anti-Western alignment. India wants strategic autonomy, access to Western technology and markets, relations with Russia and Iran, and continued engagement with China—all simultaneously.
That reality also explains the limited expectations surrounding Xi Jinping’s visit. His meeting with Modi after seven years was diplomatically significant, particularly following efforts to stabilize bilateral relations. But the border dispute remains unresolved, and the summit produced no strategic settlement between Asia’s two largest countries. Dialogue is progress; it is not yet reconciliation.
Nor should the summit’s achievements be dismissed entirely. BRICS strengthened its support for the New Development Bank, local-currency financing, development cooperation, energy security, digitalisation and reform of global institutions. The declaration also condemned unilateral coercive economic measures and called for greater representation for developing countries.
The real problem is therefore not that BRICS achieved “nothing.” It is that its ambitions are growing faster than its institutional capacity to deliver binding results.
BRICS remains important because no single member can represent the entire Global South. But its future credibility will depend on measurable outcomes: more local-currency trade, faster development financing, practical payment connectivity, stronger intra-BRICS commerce and a meaningful role in conflict mediation.
The 2026 summit demonstrated the bloc’s growing geopolitical weight—but also its internal contradictions. The stage is becoming larger, the rhetoric more ambitious and the membership more diverse. The next test is whether delivery can finally catch up with the declarations.
金砖国家机制2026：强大的合作平台，但约束性落实仍然不足
2026年在新德里举行的第十八届金砖国家峰会，无论从规模、象征意义还是外交影响力来看，都令人印象深刻。然而，在精心安排的团结与合作表述之下，一个更加棘手的问题依然存在：成员日益多元化的金砖国家机制，能否将政治宣言转化为切实的集体行动？从2026年峰会的结果来看，答案仍不确定。
目前，金砖国家机制由11个国家组成，人口约占世界总人口的一半，按购买力平价计算，其国内生产总值约占全球经济总量的40%。其不断增长的经济实力毋庸置疑。然而，成员扩展也暴露出各国在安全利益、外交政策和经济优先事项方面存在的深刻差异。
中东危机是对金砖国家机制最直接的一次考验。作为金砖成员国，伊朗直接卷入了当前与美国和以色列之间的对抗，而霍尔木兹海峡也成为国际社会高度关注的焦点。然而，《新德里宣言》并未直接点名冲突的主要当事方，而是呼吁各方“保持最大限度的克制”，并通过对话解决问题。这种谨慎是可以理解的，因为金砖成员国与华盛顿、德黑兰以及彼此之间的关系存在明显差异。但这也体现了该机制的根本局限：金砖国家可以发表政治呼吁，却无法发挥集体安全组织的作用。
伊朗与阿联酋之间的关系进一步说明了这一问题。德黑兰和阿布扎比在当前地区冲突及海上安全问题上存在明显不同的立场。据报道，谈判人员不得不协调双方对于如何在最终宣言中表述西亚冲突的分歧。阿联酋还曾公开指责伊朗扰乱海上航线，并将霍尔木兹海峡事实上关闭描述为对全球能源安全的威胁。这些分歧使金砖国家形成统一的地缘政治回应变得极其困难。
在“去美元化”问题上，同样需要保持谨慎。金砖国家在扩大本币使用和加强跨境支付合作方面已经取得了一定进展，但本次峰会并未达成共同货币、具有约束力的时间表或货币合作条约。各方仍然强调探索支付系统互联互通、本币结算以及金融基础设施建设。这确实是一种进步，但属于渐进式发展，而不是革命性变化。
因此，成员扩展既是金砖国家机制的优势，也是其弱点。埃及、埃塞俄比亚、伊朗、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋和印度尼西亚的加入，扩大了该组织的地理覆盖范围。但这些国家拥有不同的联盟关系、经济结构和地区冲突。因此，达成共识往往需要经过谨慎谈判的措辞，而不是制定大胆而统一的共同政策。
经济领域的矛盾同样十分明显。峰会宣言一方面承认化石能源仍然具有重要地位，另一方面又呼吁推动有序、公平的能源转型。这并不一定意味着虚伪，因为发展中经济体确实面临不同的能源条件。然而，这种表述反映出一个现实难题：如何协调碳氢化合物生产国的利益与那些希望快速实现脱碳的国家之间的优先目标。
印度可能处于最有意思的位置。印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪在新德里接待了包括弗拉基米尔·普京、马苏德·佩泽希齐扬和习近平在内的多国领导人，同时继续维持印度与美国及其他西方伙伴之间广泛的战略关系。因此，新德里的立场表明，加入金砖国家机制并不意味着必须采取反西方立场。印度希望同时实现战略自主、获得西方技术和市场、维持与俄罗斯和伊朗的关系，并继续与中国保持接触。
这一现实也解释了外界为何对习近平访问印度的成果保持有限预期。习近平时隔七年与莫迪举行会晤，具有重要的外交意义，尤其是在双方努力稳定双边关系的背景下。然而，中印边界争端仍未解决，峰会也没有促成亚洲两个最大国家之间的战略性解决方案。对话是一种进步，但还不能等同于和解。
与此同时，也不应完全否定本次峰会取得的成果。金砖国家加强了对新开发银行、本币融资、发展合作、能源安全、数字化以及全球机构改革的支持。峰会宣言还谴责单边经济胁迫措施，并呼吁提高发展中国家在国际体系中的代表性。
因此，真正的问题并不是金砖国家“什么也没有取得”，而是其战略雄心的增长速度已经快于其制度能力实现具有约束力的成果的速度。
金砖国家机制仍然十分重要，因为任何一个成员国都无法单独代表整个全球南方。然而，其未来的信誉将取决于能否取得可衡量的成果，包括扩大本币贸易、加快发展融资、推进实际支付系统互联互通、加强金砖成员之间的贸易，以及在冲突调解中发挥更加有意义的作用。
2026年峰会展示了金砖国家日益增强的地缘政治影响力，也暴露了其内部矛盾。这个平台的规模越来越大，政治表述越来越雄心勃勃，成员构成也更加多元。下一项考验在于：金砖国家能否最终让实际落实赶上政治宣言。
(注意： 本文是用AI翻译的，或有误差。请以原版英文为准。谢谢。)
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