(下边有中文翻译，请继续看到底。 谢谢。）
The latest confrontation in the Persian Gulf raises a difficult question that deserves more attention: who ultimately bears the greatest economic cost when maritime pressure is imposed on Iran and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted? The answer is not necessarily Iran alone. The consequences extend across the entire Gulf, including some of America’s closest regional partners.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. In 2025, approximately 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through it each day—around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. The economies of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE are all directly exposed to disruptions, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess alternative export routes that provide them with some protection.
This makes the current strategy particularly complicated for Washington. The economic weapon directed at Iran can simultaneously damage the economic foundations of friendly Gulf states.
Qatar illustrates the problem. Its LNG industry depends overwhelmingly on maritime access through Hormuz; the IEA estimates that about 93 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports transit the strait. The UAE is similarly exposed, with about 96 percent of its LNG exports normally passing through Hormuz. Together, these flows represent roughly one-fifth of global LNG trade.
Kuwait and Iraq are also highly dependent on the waterway for energy exports. Bahrain has limited oil resources and is particularly vulnerable to regional disruption. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are better positioned because pipelines can redirect some crude toward the Red Sea and Fujairah. Yet these alternatives cannot completely replace maritime capacity. The IEA estimates that only about 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day of additional crude-export capacity can bypass Hormuz.
The economic consequences are therefore broader than lost oil revenue. Gulf economies depend heavily on international shipping for machinery, food, consumer products, construction materials and manufactured goods. A prolonged maritime crisis increases freight and insurance costs, disrupts supply chains and threatens tourism, aviation and investment. Recent reporting indicates that Gulf oil exports remained roughly 40 percent below pre-war levels in July, demonstrating the scale of the disruption.
Iran, of course, is suffering enormously as well. It would be incorrect to portray the Iranian economy as unaffected. Inflation, currency depreciation, shortages, and declining oil exports have imposed substantial costs on ordinary people. Iranian oil shipments to China reportedly fell sharply in August, demonstrating that the blockade and sanctions are having a real economic impact.
Yet Iran possesses an important characteristic that should not be underestimated: adaptation born from decades of sanctions and isolation. Iran has developed domestic manufacturing, informal trading networks, alternative financial arrangements and mechanisms for maintaining essential supplies. Its economy is considerably more diversified than a simple oil-export model. Analysts note that domestic agriculture, manufacturing, services and informal commerce have helped prevent economic collapse despite extraordinary pressure.
This resilience does not mean that Iran is immune to economic hardship. Rather, it means that economic pressure does not automatically translate into political capitulation.
The larger strategic problem for Washington is that Iran is not the only party paying the price. Gulf states that spent decades building themselves into global commercial, financial and energy hubs depend upon precisely the open maritime environment that prolonged confrontation threatens.
There is also a global dimension. China remains Iran’s principal oil customer, and despite severe restrictions, Chinese independent refiners have continued purchasing Iranian crude. Beijing has rejected unilateral American sanctions and favours diplomatic resolution.
Washington therefore faces a strategic paradox: a policy designed to weaken Iran can simultaneously impose enormous costs on America’s partners, disrupt global energy markets and encourage countries to develop alternative trade routes and financial mechanisms.
The Gulf states should not be viewed merely as collateral damage. They are major economic partners whose prosperity depends on regional stability and uninterrupted commerce. Their interests deserve serious consideration in any strategy toward Iran.
The lesson is not that Iran is invulnerable. The lesson is that maximum pressure can produce maximum regional costs without necessarily producing maximum political results.
A durable solution requires diplomacy, secure maritime commerce and a negotiated regional framework. Military pressure may produce temporary leverage, but stability is ultimately measured by whether ordinary people can live, trade and prosper.
If a policy intended to isolate Iran ends up economically weakening America’s closest Gulf partners, disrupting global energy supplies and encouraging the region to seek alternatives to American strategic protection, Washington should ask a fundamental question: is the pressure achieving its objective—or is it gradually damaging the very regional order America seeks to preserve?
波斯湾封锁：对伊朗施压损害美国盟友的利益。
波斯湾最新一轮对抗提出了一个值得更多关注的棘手问题：当对伊朗施加海上压力、霍尔木兹海峡的航运受到干扰时，最终承担最大经济代价的究竟是谁？答案未必只是伊朗。其影响波及整个海湾地区，其中也包括美国一些最亲密的地区伙伴。
霍尔木兹海峡是世界最重要的能源咽喉之一。2025年，每天约有2,000万桶石油及石油产品通过该海峡，约占全球海运石油贸易的四分之一。伊朗、伊拉克、科威特、卡塔尔、巴林和阿联酋的经济都直接受到航运中断的影响，而沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋则拥有替代性的出口路线，因此具备一定程度的缓冲能力。
这使华盛顿当前的战略显得尤为复杂。原本旨在针对伊朗的经济手段，也可能同时损害美国友好海湾国家的经济基础。
卡塔尔就是一个典型例子。其液化天然气产业高度依赖通过霍尔木兹海峡的海上通道。国际能源署估计，约93%的卡塔尔液化天然气出口需要经过该海峡。阿联酋同样面临较高风险，其约96%的液化天然气出口通常也通过霍尔木兹海峡。两国相关的能源运输合计约占全球液化天然气贸易的五分之一。
科威特和伊拉克的能源出口同样高度依赖这条水道。巴林本身石油资源有限，因此对地区局势动荡尤其敏感。沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋的处境相对较好，因为它们可以通过管道将部分原油转运至红海和富查伊拉港。然而，这些替代路线无法完全取代海上运输能力。国际能源署估计，能够绕过霍尔木兹海峡的额外原油出口能力仅约为每天350万至550万桶。
因此，经济影响远不只是石油收入的损失。海湾国家的经济高度依赖国际航运，以进口机械、食品、消费品、建筑材料和各种制成品。长期的海上危机会推高运费和保险成本，扰乱供应链，并对旅游业、航空业和投资环境构成威胁。近期报道显示，7月份海湾地区的石油出口量仍比战前水平低约40%，这反映出此次危机造成的严重冲击。
当然，伊朗同样遭受了巨大损失。如果认为伊朗经济没有受到影响，那显然是不准确的。通货膨胀、货币贬值、物资短缺以及石油出口下降，都给普通民众带来了沉重压力。据报道，伊朗8月份对中国的石油运输量大幅下降，这表明封锁和制裁确实对伊朗经济造成了实际影响。
然而，伊朗拥有一个不应被低估的重要特点：经过数十年制裁和孤立所形成的适应能力。伊朗已经发展出一定规模的国内制造业、非正式贸易网络、替代性金融安排以及维持基本生活物资供应的机制。与单纯依赖石油出口的经济模式相比，伊朗的经济结构更加多元化。分析人士指出，国内农业、制造业、服务业和非正式商业活动，在极端压力下帮助伊朗避免了经济全面崩溃。
这种韧性并不意味着伊朗不会受到经济困难的影响，而是说明经济压力并不会自动转化为政治上的屈服。
对华盛顿而言，更大的战略问题在于，付出代价的并不只有伊朗。过去数十年来，海湾国家努力将自身建设成为全球商业、金融和能源中心，而这些发展高度依赖开放、安全和稳定的海上贸易环境。长期的地区对抗恰恰可能破坏这些国家赖以繁荣的基础。
此外，这场危机还具有全球性影响。中国仍然是伊朗石油最重要的客户。尽管面临严厉限制，中国的独立炼油企业仍持续购买伊朗原油。北京反对单边制裁，并主张通过外交手段解决争端。
因此，华盛顿面临着一种战略悖论：一项旨在削弱伊朗的政策，可能同时给美国的伙伴造成巨大经济损失，扰乱全球能源市场，并促使更多国家寻求替代性的贸易路线和金融机制。
海湾国家不应仅仅被视为这场战略博弈中的“附带损失”。它们是重要的经济伙伴，其繁荣依赖于地区稳定和贸易畅通。在制定任何针对伊朗的战略时，这些国家的利益都应得到认真考虑。
其中的教训并不是伊朗不可战胜，而是“极限施压”可能带来“极限的地区成本”，却未必能够产生相应的政治效果。
持久的解决方案需要外交努力、安全的海上贸易环境以及通过谈判建立地区性框架。军事压力或许能够在短期内形成某种筹码，但真正的稳定最终应以普通民众能否正常生活、贸易和发展来衡量。
如果一项旨在孤立伊朗的政策，最终却在经济上削弱美国最亲密的海湾伙伴、扰乱全球能源供应，并促使该地区寻求美国战略保护体系之外的替代方案，那么华盛顿就应认真思考一个根本问题：这种施压政策究竟是否正在实现其目标，还是正在逐步损害美国自身试图维护的地区秩序？
(注意： 本文是用AI翻译的，或有误差。请以原版英文为准。谢谢。)
Reference Link:- https://sovereignista.com/2026/08/25/the-persian-gulf-blockade-when-pressure-on-iran-hurts-americas-allies/