(下边有中文翻译，请继续看到底。 谢谢。）
The threat by President Donald Trump to impose what U.S. officials describe as an exceptionally severe new sanctions regime against Iran has reopened an old debate: can economic coercion achieve political objectives that diplomacy and military power have failed to secure?
The answer, based on decades of experience, is far from straightforward.
Iran has lived under varying degrees of U.S. sanctions for decades. These measures have unquestionably imposed serious economic costs, restricted investment, complicated banking transactions and contributed to hardship for ordinary Iranians. Yet hardship and political capitulation are not the same thing. The historical record suggests that sanctions often weaken economies without necessarily compelling the targeted state to accept the political outcome demanded by the sanctioning power.
That is the central dilemma facing Washington today.
Recent reporting indicates that the Trump administration is preparing an intensified economic campaign against Iran, including pressure on countries and companies that continue to trade with Tehran. Iran, however, has responded that further sanctions will not force it into submission. The broader confrontation has already demonstrated the limits of assuming that military or economic pressure alone can dictate political outcomes.
Iran should not be underestimated. It is an ancient civilization that has survived invasions, revolutions, wars, isolation, and repeated periods of economic pressure. Its history has produced a political culture accustomed to adversity. Whatever one may think of Iran’s government or its policies, the resilience of Iranian society and the country’s ability to adapt to external pressure are undeniable.
Sanctions may damage an economy, but they can also produce unintended consequences. They encourage countries to develop alternative trading mechanisms, diversify partnerships, reduce dependence on Western financial institutions, and strengthen domestic production. Long-term pressure can therefore generate adaptation rather than surrender.
China is particularly important in this equation. It remains the principal destination for Iranian oil, with estimates indicating that it purchased around 1.38 million barrels per day in 2025 and accounted for more than 80 percent of Iran’s seaborne oil exports. A sophisticated network of traders, refiners and intermediaries has already emerged to manage commerce despite existing restrictions.
This does not mean that Iran is immune to economic pressure. It clearly is not. But it does mean that Washington cannot simply assume that announcing sanctions will automatically produce complete international compliance.
Here an important legal and political distinction must be made. The United States has the authority to regulate the conduct of its own citizens, companies and financial institutions. It may impose unilateral sanctions under its domestic laws. However, U.S. sanctions are not, by themselves, equivalent to universally binding United Nations sanctions.
Measures authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII can create obligations for UN member states. A unilateral American sanctions programme, by contrast, does not automatically impose a legal duty on every sovereign state to terminate its relations with Iran. The legality and legitimacy of unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions remain contested under international law. UN experts and legal scholars have repeatedly raised concerns about coercive measures that operate beyond the authority of the Security Council or interfere with the sovereign economic choices of third countries.
This distinction is especially relevant if Washington attempts to employ extensive secondary sanctions. Such measures seek to pressure foreign companies and governments by threatening them with exclusion from the American market or financial system. They can be highly effective because of the importance of the U.S. dollar and American financial institutions. But effectiveness does not automatically resolve the questions of legitimacy, sovereignty, or long-term geopolitical consequences.
Indeed, excessive reliance on secondary sanctions can encourage other countries to seek alternatives to the existing Western-dominated financial architecture.
Washington also faces a changing international environment. Even close U.S. partners do not always share its approach to sanctions and foreign policy. Japan, for example, recently described U.S. sanctions against senior officials of the International Criminal Court as “very unfortunate,” illustrating that even strong allies can publicly disagree with Washington’s use of economic and legal pressure.
It would therefore be unwise to assume that Europe, Asian powers and regional states will uniformly embrace every new American measure against Iran. Their positions will depend on their own security interests, commercial calculations and legal assessments. Some may comply fully; others may comply selectively; still others may seek ways to preserve limited economic engagement.
Iran’s other regional relationships also matter. Turkey continues significant trade with Iran, while Iraq, Oman, Pakistan and several neighboring states maintain economic or diplomatic links of varying importance. The pattern is complex, but it demonstrates that isolating a large country of Iran’s size, population and strategic location is far more difficult than issuing a sanctions order from Washington.
The real danger is that sanctions become a substitute for diplomacy. Economic pressure may be useful as leverage when linked to realistic negotiations and clearly defined objectives. But sanctions without a credible diplomatic exit can harden positions on both sides.
The United States should therefore consider the lessons of history. Maximum pressure may demonstrate strength, but strength is ultimately measured by results. If sanctions impose suffering without changing policy, isolate allies rather than build coalitions, and accelerate the search for alternatives to American financial dominance, then Washington may find that its chosen instrument has become counterproductive.
Iran has endured severe pressure before and remains standing. Its people have demonstrated remarkable resilience, while its state has repeatedly developed mechanisms to survive economic isolation. There is little reason to believe that additional unilateral sanctions alone will suddenly transform Iran’s political calculations.
The wiser path is not endless escalation. It is principled diplomacy, multilateral engagement and negotiated solutions. A policy designed to isolate Iran must also consider an uncomfortable possibility: if pursued without broad international support, it may ultimately contribute to the further isolation of the United States itself.
伊朗与制裁的局限：为何经济压力可能无法实现华盛顿期望的结果.
唐纳德·特朗普总统威胁对伊朗实施美国官员所称的极其严厉的新一轮制裁措施，再次引发了一个长期存在的争论：当外交和军事力量都未能实现既定政治目标时，经济胁迫能否达到同样的目的？
根据数十年的经验，这一问题的答案远非简单明了。
伊朗数十年来一直承受不同程度的美国制裁。这些措施无疑给伊朗经济造成了严重代价，限制了投资，增加了银行交易的困难，也给普通伊朗民众带来了经济压力。然而，经济困难与政治屈服并不是一回事。历史记录表明，制裁往往能够削弱一个国家的经济，却未必能够迫使被制裁国家接受制裁国所要求的政治结果。
这正是当前华盛顿所面临的核心困境。
近期报道显示，特朗普政府正在准备对伊朗实施更加强化的经济施压行动，包括向继续与德黑兰进行贸易的国家和企业施加压力。然而，伊朗已经回应称，进一步制裁不会迫使其屈服。更广泛的对抗已经表明，单纯依靠军事或经济压力，并不能确保政治目标的实现。
**伊朗不应被低估。**这是一个拥有悠久文明历史的国家，经历过入侵、革命、战争、国际孤立以及多轮经济压力。漫长的历史塑造了伊朗社会面对逆境的政治文化和适应能力。无论人们如何评价伊朗政府及其政策，伊朗社会的韧性以及该国适应外部压力的能力都是不容忽视的。
制裁可能损害一个国家的经济，但也可能产生意想不到的后果。制裁会促使有关国家建立替代性贸易机制，实现贸易伙伴多元化，降低对西方金融机构的依赖，并加强国内生产能力。因此，长期压力有时产生的并不是投降，而是适应与调整。
在这一问题上，中国尤其重要。中国仍然是伊朗石油的主要出口目的地。据估计，2025年中国每天购买约138万桶伊朗石油，占伊朗海运石油出口量的80%以上。与此同时，一个由贸易商、炼油企业和中间商组成的复杂网络已经形成，使双方能够在现有制裁环境下继续开展商业活动。
这并不意味着伊朗能够完全免受经济压力。显然不是。但这意味着华盛顿不能简单地认为，只要宣布制裁，就能够自动获得国际社会的全面配合。
这里必须区分一个重要的法律和政治问题。美国有权依据本国法律规范美国公民、企业和金融机构的行为，也可以根据美国国内法实施单边制裁。然而，美国制裁本身并不等同于具有普遍约束力的联合国制裁。
联合国安全理事会根据《联合国宪章》第七章授权采取的措施，可以对联合国会员国产生国际法上的义务。相比之下，美国单方面实施的制裁计划，并不会自动赋予美国要求所有主权国家终止与伊朗关系的法律权力。**单边制裁和域外制裁的合法性与正当性，在国际法领域仍存在争议。**联合国有关专家和国际法学者也多次对超越安全理事会授权、干涉第三国主权经济选择的强制性措施表示担忧。
如果华盛顿进一步大规模使用“次级制裁”，这一区别就更加重要。次级制裁试图通过威胁外国企业和政府——例如将其排除在美国市场或金融体系之外——迫使其服从美国政策。由于美元和美国金融机构在全球金融体系中的重要地位，这类措施确实可能具有很强的现实效力。然而，有效性并不能自动解决其合法性、国家主权以及长期地缘政治后果问题。
事实上，过度依赖次级制裁可能促使更多国家寻找现有西方主导金融体系之外的替代方案。
与此同时，华盛顿面对的国际环境也正在发生变化。即使是美国的亲密盟友，也并不总是认同美国的制裁政策和外交路线。例如，日本近期曾将美国针对国际刑事法院高级官员实施的制裁称为“非常令人遗憾”，这说明即便是美国的重要盟友，也可能公开反对华盛顿使用经济和法律压力的方式。
因此，认为欧洲、亚洲大国以及中东地区国家会一致支持美国针对伊朗采取的每一项新措施，是不明智的。各国最终将根据自身安全利益、商业利益和法律判断作出决定。有些国家可能完全遵守；有些可能选择性遵守；还有一些则可能寻求维持有限的经济往来。
伊朗与周边国家的关系同样具有重要意义。土耳其与伊朗保持着相当规模的贸易往来，伊拉克、阿曼、巴基斯坦以及其他邻国也与伊朗保持着不同程度的经济或外交联系。这种关系网络十分复杂，但它说明：要全面孤立一个拥有庞大人口、广阔领土和重要战略地理位置的伊朗，远比华盛顿发布一项制裁命令困难得多。
真正值得警惕的是，制裁逐渐成为外交的替代品。经济压力如果与现实可行的谈判以及明确的政治目标相结合，可以成为一种外交杠杆。但如果制裁没有可信的外交出口，就可能使双方立场进一步强硬。
因此，美国应当认真吸取历史经验。“极限施压”或许能够展示力量，但真正的力量最终应该以结果来衡量。如果制裁只是造成经济困难，却无法改变伊朗的政策；如果制裁导致美国盟友产生分歧而不是形成更广泛的联盟；如果制裁反而加速其他国家寻找替代美国金融体系的途径，那么华盛顿最终可能发现，自己选择的政策工具正在产生适得其反的效果。
伊朗过去已经承受过严厉的外部压力，并且依然存在。伊朗人民展现出了非凡的韧性，其国家也一次又一次建立起应对经济孤立的机制。因此，没有充分理由认为，新增的单边制裁能够突然改变伊朗的政治计算。
**更加明智的道路不是无限升级，而是坚持原则的外交、多边参与以及通过谈判寻求解决方案。**一个旨在孤立伊朗的政策，也必须面对一个令人不安的可能性：如果没有广泛的国际支持而继续推进，美国最终可能发现，其对伊朗实施的单边制裁不仅没有实现预期目标，反而可能进一步加剧美国自身在国际社会中的孤立。
(注意： 本文是用AI翻译的，或有误差。请以原版英文为准。谢谢。)
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