The Trump administration’s declared campaign to “disable” the International Criminal Court is not only a dispute between Washington and one tribunal. It is a direct challenge to the idea that powerful states, their officials, and their allies can be held accountable under international law. The issue raises a difficult but necessary question: Is international justice meant for all, or only for the weak?
The International Criminal Court, known as the ICC, was created by the Rome Statute, adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002. It was established after the painful experience of the Second World War, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and later atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The central idea was simple: when national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute the gravest crimes, an independent international court should be available.
The ICC’s mandate is limited but serious. It deals with genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. It does not replace national courts. Instead, it operates on the principle of complementarity, meaning it acts only when domestic legal systems fail to act genuinely. Its purpose is not to punish states as political entities, but to hold individuals accountable, including presidents, ministers, military commanders, rebel leaders, and others accused of grave crimes.
Today, more than 120 states are parties to the Rome Statute. The United States is not one of them. Washington signed the statute under President Bill Clinton, but never ratified it. The George W. Bush administration later rejected the court more openly, fearing that U.S. soldiers, intelligence officials, and political leaders could face politically motivated prosecutions. Since then, U.S. policy toward the ICC has moved between limited cooperation and open hostility, but one position has remained largely consistent: the U.S. does not accept ICC jurisdiction over American citizens.
This explains why Washington never fully “owned” the ICC. The United States supports accountability when the court investigates rivals, weaker states, or adversaries, but it resists the same standards when the potential subjects are Americans or close allies. This selective approach has weakened U.S. moral credibility. A rules-based order cannot be credible if the strongest power insists that rules apply to others but not to itself.
The latest pressure campaign is much more aggressive. According to reports, the U.S. State Department has promised a “whole-of-government response” to systematically restrict the ICC’s ability to operate. Measures under consideration include sanctions, travel bans, visa restrictions, financial pressure, and diplomatic pressure on countries that cooperate with the court. Washington is also urging partner states, especially those dependent on U.S. military or law-enforcement assistance, to reject ICC authority over American officials and service members.
This is not an ordinary legal disagreement. It is coercion. When a powerful state threatens smaller or dependent states with consequences for cooperating with an international judicial institution, it undermines the independence of justice. The message is clear: if the ICC investigates the wrong people, it will be punished. If human rights groups provide evidence, they may be targeted. If court officials continue their work, they may face sanctions and restrictions.
The connection with Israel is central. In November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. The court alleged responsibility for crimes including starvation as a method of warfare and crimes against humanity, such as murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts. Israel rejects the court’s jurisdiction and denies wrongdoing. The United States has also strongly rejected ICC action against Israeli leaders.
Can the U.S. sideline the International Court of Justice as well? The ICJ and ICC are different institutions. The ICJ settles legal disputes between states and is part of the United Nations system. The ICC prosecutes individuals for international crimes. The U.S. cannot abolish either court by itself. However, it can weaken them politically by refusing jurisdiction, ignoring decisions, pressuring allies, cutting funding, or attacking their legitimacy. This does not destroy international law formally, but it damages its authority in practice.
The world must decide whether international law is universal or selective. If the ICC can investigate African leaders, Russian officials, militia commanders, and weaker actors, then it must also be able to investigate Western leaders and their allies when credible allegations arise. Justice cannot depend on nationality, alliance, or military power.
The campaign against the ICC is therefore a test of the international system. If the court is punished for pursuing accountability in Gaza or elsewhere, the message will be devastating: law applies only where power permits it. That would not be international justice. It would be an international hierarchy.
特朗普政府公开宣称要“削弱”国际刑事法院，这不仅是华盛顿与某一个司法机构之间的争议，更是对一个基本理念的直接挑战：强国、强国官员及其盟友，是否也应当受到国际法的约束并承担责任。
这一问题提出了一个困难但必须回答的问题：国际司法究竟适用于所有国家和个人，还是只适用于弱者？
国际刑事法院，英文简称ICC，是依据《罗马规约》设立的。《罗马规约》于1998年通过，并于2002年正式生效。该法院的建立，源于国际社会对第二次世界大战、种族灭绝、种族清洗，以及后来卢旺达和前南斯拉夫暴行的深刻反思。
其核心理念十分明确：当一国国内法院不愿意或无法对最严重的国际罪行进行真正调查和起诉时，应当有一个独立的国际司法机构介入。
国际刑事法院的管辖范围虽然有限，但所处理的案件极其重大，包括种族灭绝罪、危害人类罪、战争罪和侵略罪。
国际刑事法院并不取代各国国内法院，而是遵循“补充性原则”。这意味着，只有在一国国内司法体系未能真正采取行动时，国际刑事法院才会介入。
此后，美国对国际刑事法院的政策在有限合作与公开敌视之间不断变化，但有一个立场基本没有改变：美国不接受国际刑事法院对美国公民行使管辖权。
这也解释了为什么华盛顿从未真正全面接受国际刑事法院。
当国际刑事法院调查美国的对手、较弱国家或敌对势力时，美国往往支持所谓的国际问责；但当潜在调查对象是美国公民或美国的亲密盟友时，华盛顿则拒绝适用相同标准。
这种选择性立场削弱了美国的道义信誉。一个所谓“以规则为基础的国际秩序”不可能具有真正的可信度，如果最强大的国家坚持认为规则只适用于别人，而不适用于自己。
目前，美国针对国际刑事法院展开的施压行动比以往更加激进。
据有关报道，美国国务院承诺采取“全政府应对措施”，系统性限制国际刑事法院的运作能力。美国正在考虑的措施包括制裁、旅行禁令、签证限制、金融压力，以及对与国际刑事法院合作的国家施加外交压力。
华盛顿还在敦促合作伙伴，尤其是依赖美国军事援助或执法援助的国家，拒绝国际刑事法院对美国官员和军人行使管辖权。
这并不是普通的法律分歧，而是一种胁迫行为。
当一个强国威胁较小国家或依赖本国援助的国家，要求它们不得与国际司法机构合作时，司法独立性就会受到破坏。
美国传递的信息十分清楚：如果国际刑事法院调查了“不该调查的人”，法院就会受到惩罚；如果人权组织提供证据，它们可能成为打击目标；如果法院官员继续履行职责，他们可能遭受制裁和各种限制。
以色列问题是此次争议的核心。
2024年11月，国际刑事法院对以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡和前国防部长约亚夫·加兰特签发逮捕令，指控他们涉嫌在加沙实施战争罪和危害人类罪。
法院所提出的指控包括将饥饿作为战争手段，以及谋杀、迫害和其他不人道行为等危害人类罪。
以色列拒绝接受国际刑事法院的管辖权，并否认存在违法行为。美国也强烈反对国际刑事法院针对以色列领导人的行动。
因此，许多观察人士认为，华盛顿目前的施压行动是为了帮助以色列逃避问责。
问题并不在于内塔尼亚胡或其他被指控者在审判前是否有罪。对有罪与否作出判断，是法院的职责。
真正的问题是，强大国家的盟友是否可以完全逃避司法审查。
如果美国不是通过法律辩护保护以色列官员，而是通过制裁和恐吓国际刑事法院本身来阻止调查，那么这实际上等于宣布：某些盟友可以凌驾于国际法之上。
美国是否凌驾于国际法之上？
从法律角度看，答案是否定的。任何国家都不应凌驾于国际法之上。
美国受到其已经批准的国际条约、国际习惯法、《联合国宪章》以及其他法律义务的约束。
但从政治现实看，美国的强大实力，往往使其比弱小国家更容易逃避问责。
这正是当前国际法体系的根本问题：国际法确实存在，但执行并不平等。
强国可以拖延、拒绝、施压，甚至惩罚那些挑战它们的国际机构；弱国通常没有这样的能力。
美国是否也能够架空国际法院？
国际法院与国际刑事法院是两个不同的机构。
第一，战争罪和危害人类罪的受害者可能对国际司法失去希望。
第二，专制政府和实施严重侵权行为的政府，可能会利用美国的做法作为拒绝问责的理由。
第三，较小国家可能由此得出结论，认为国际法只不过是强权政治的工具。
第四，第二次世界大战后建立的国际法律秩序可能变得更加脆弱、更具选择性，也更加缺乏尊重。
这还可能助长有罪不罚现象。
如果领导人相信自己可以依靠政治保护逃避问责，国际法的威慑作用就会下降。
战争罪将更容易被否认，调查会变得更加困难，受害者则会被忽视。
这种结果不会带来稳定，反而会创造一个更加危险的世界，使法律逐渐被权力所取代。
美国应当通过法律途径捍卫自己的法律主张，而不是依靠恐吓。
如果华盛顿认为国际刑事法院超越了自身权限，它可以通过法律程序、外交渠道和原则性辩论提出自己的立场。
但试图让国际刑事法院失去运作能力，则完全是另一回事。这种做法反映的不是对司法的信心，而是对问责的恐惧。
国际刑事法院并不完美。
该法院长期以来受到多方面批评，包括案件审理进展缓慢、执法具有选择性、内部管理问题以及受到政治压力等。
然而，对不完善司法的正确回应应当是改革，而不是摧毁。
因此，针对国际刑事法院的行动，是对整个国际体系的一次重大考验。
如果国际刑事法院因为在加沙或其他地区追究责任而受到惩罚，其传递的信息将是毁灭性的：法律只有在权力允许的范围内才能适用。
那将不再是国际司法，而是国际等级秩序。
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