{"id":19800,"date":"2025-05-27T08:54:40","date_gmt":"2025-05-27T08:54:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/?p=19800"},"modified":"2025-05-27T08:54:42","modified_gmt":"2025-05-27T08:54:42","slug":"india-unexpected-fallout-of-op-sindoor-has-been-tilt-in-pakistans-military-balance-toward-its-air-force","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/?p=19800","title":{"rendered":"India: Unexpected Fallout of Op Sindoor Has Been Tilt in Pakistan\u2019s Military Balance Toward Its Air Force"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, the Pakistan Air Force has emerged with newfound operational credibility, eclipsing the Pakistan Army\u2019s traditional dominance for the first time in decades. With cutting-edge electronic warfare, AI-enabled capabilities, and Chinese support, the PAF\u2019s performance has reignited internal debates on civil-military balance, strategic control, and institutional relevance \u2013 marking a subtle but significant shift in the country\u2019s military power structure.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A subtle, but perceptible shift appears to be underway within Pakistan\u2019s omnipresent military establishment, with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) seemingly gaining operational ascendency over the traditionally dominant Army in the post-Operation Sindoor scenario.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Open-source intelligence and online tracking data have revealed that over four days of hostilities, the  PAF effectively dominated airspace management and electronic warfare (EW) dynamics, in countering Indian Air Force (IAF) strikes on nine terrorist camps across Pakistan, early on May 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, the Army\u2019s ground-based air defences (GDAD) were reportedly sluggish, reactive and heavily reliant on the PAF for early warning and threat engagement, reducing its operational role to that of a  \u2018tactical adjunct\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And, for the first time in a major and direct confrontation with India, the Army was publicly overshadowed by the PAF\u2019s performance that earned it plaudits  from foreign observers, Pakistan\u2019s civil-military elite and segments of its informed public, at home and abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018Still in charge\u2019<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A cross-section of defence analysts and Pakistan watchers believe this operational \u2018imbalance\u2019 may have prompted last week\u2019s elevation of Army Chief General Asim Munir to the five-star rank of Field Marshal, which has also been interpreted as an attempt to reassert the Army\u2019s primacy. As one Pakistani commentator drolly noted to The Wire<\/em>, the extra star on Munir\u2019s upgraded epaulettes has come as a reminder to Pakistanis of who was still in charge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also read: Asim Munir\u2019s Elevation to Field Marshal Likely to Disturb Military Norms, Succession Dynamics<\/a><\/ins><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even Pakistan\u2019s political leadership, media and service veterans feted and spotlighted Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu for the PAFs performance in Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos (wall of lead), shifting focus away from the Army\u2019s ubiquitous General Headquarters or GHQ in Rawalpindi, to Air HQ in nearby Islamabad. In turn, this collectively acknowledged the PAF\u2019s reputation as a \u2018technologically forward-leaning service\u2019, appreciably punching way above its institutional weight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such repositioning has further spurred speculation in some security quarters that Pakistan\u2019s civilian administration was shrewdly pitting the PAF against the Army, mirroring tactics long employed by the latter to manipulate and control the country\u2019s polity.  And, in recognition of the PAFs capable and professional working, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif approved a service extension for ACM Sidhu on May 20, making him the second Pakistani air chief to receive such a tenure after ACM Anwar Shamin in 1981. Curiously, however, the length of Sindhu\u2019s new term has not been publicly disclosed, prompting speculation that this ambiguity could reflect a \u2018calculated\u2019 move, possibly at Munir\u2019s behest, to reassert the Army\u2019s overarching primacy.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The PAFs edge, insiders said, stemmed primarily from its AI-enabled EW and real-time sensor fusion capabilities developed presciently since 2018 with quiet Chinese assistance via the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Cell at Air HQ.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s role<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Analysts said this partnership with Beijing had transformed the PAF from a \u2018reactive force to a battlespace shaper\u2019. Its ability to integrate radar feeds, Chinese BeiDou and Gaofen satellite imagery and drone and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)- sourced electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT\/SIGINT) in real time, had further enabled it to pre-position assets in \u2018kill-zones\u2019 and execute precision strikes and missile evasions for itself on May 7, a point noted by some defence analysts in India.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This advantage was further amplified and operationalised by its advanced fleet of AI-supported Chinese-origin fighters like JF-10C\/CE Vigorous Dragons and JF-17 Thunders, both armed with PL-15\/E beyond visual range missiles and upgraded F-16s, all backed by Saab 2000 \u2018Erieye\u2019 AEW&C platforms. Military sources said the PAF had further executed jugaad or innovation on these fighters to further enhance their EW and radar lethality and precision weapon deliverability.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Pakistan claimed to have shot down five IAF fighters during this engagement, but India has neither confirmed nor denied any platform downing, only acknowledging that combat aircraft losses were incumbent in such missions. Independent estimates, however, suggest India may have lost between two and four fighters in standoff engagements with the PAF, but specific details were unavailable for now.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Political backing<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A Pakistani analyst observed that after Operation Sindoor, the PAF may have gained ascendancy in perception, credibility, and tactical competence \u2013 especially among military professionals \u2013 but it lacked the political levers to domestically press its advantage. It also had little or no control over narrative-building, which remained firmly in the hands of the Army-run Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the institution that orchestrates its vice-like grip over the state apparatus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Army, on the other hand, he said \u2013 declining to be named \u2013 continued to enjoy pre-eminence over Pakistan\u2019s security architecture, including control of its nuclear arsenal and influence over political, economic, diplomatic, and ideological trajectories. However, despite its clout, it had still come in for quiet criticism in recent days over delays in deployment during India\u2019s Op Sindoor and was also being quietly faulted for politicising its strategic messaging and clinging to outdated \u2018myths\u2019 around strategic depth. Many considered these as \u2018feeble\u2019 explanations for its apparent  operational inefficiencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, the PAF and Pakistan Navy (PN) \u2013 though integral to Pakistan\u2019s nuclear triad responsible for delivering nuclear weapons by land, air, and sea \u2013 have historically remained subordinate to the Army, despite fulfilling critical conventional roles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This structural imbalance dates back to Partition, when the Army received a disproportionate share of personnel and resources, institutionalising its dominance and reinforcing the oft-quoted maxim: most countries have an army, but Pakistan\u2019s army has a country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At independence, the PN inherited around 3,000 personnel and a modest fleet of four sloops, patrol craft, and auxiliary vessels from the Royal Indian Navy. The PAF began with approximately 2,000\u20132,500 personnel and a single operational fighter squadron of 16 outdated Hawker Tempest IIs \u2013 its share from the Royal Indian Air Force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For years afterward, all three services were commanded by British officers and lacked indigenous leadership, infrastructure, or strategic depth. But this absence was more acutely felt in the PAF and PN, which emerged as auxiliary arms to the Army \u2013 an institution that swiftly established itself as Pakistan\u2019s paramount authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nearly eight decades later, this organisational imbalance persists. The Army\u2019s 560,000-strong force dwarfs the PAF\u2019s 70,000 and the PN\u2019s 30,000 personnel. The Army\u2019s dominance was further entrenched through coups, by ruling Pakistan directly for 34 years, and wielding indirect control for much of the remaining 44.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Army hegemony through history<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

History too aided the Army\u2019s hegemony. Cast from inception as the guardian of Pakistan\u2019s Islamic ideology and borders, the Army fought four land-centric wars with India \u2013 three over Kashmir \u2013 further supplementing its central role as a fighting force. It realised early on that coups were easier when tanks are near the capital, not parked in hangars or afloat at sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the Army wrote Pakistan\u2019s strategic playbook, cast itself as the lead actor, and relegated the PAF and PN to supporting roles \u2013 becoming executive producer, director, and star of the national security theatre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Domestically, too it monopolised internal security and counter-insurgency operations in the Frontier Agency regions, bordering Afghanistan and in Baluchistan. It also armed and trained  Mujahideen to fight the Soviet Union\u2019s occupation of Afghanistan and later patronised the Taliban.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of its lieutenant generals has always headed the all-powerful, tri-service ISID as Director General (DG). Notably, though, in the early 1950s \u2013 soon after its founding on New Year\u2019s Day in 1948 by Major General Walter Cawthorn, then Pakistan Army Deputy Chief, soon after the Kashmir campaign \u2013 a naval officer briefly served as ISID chief. Since then, however, the post has remained the exclusive preserve of the Army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also read: High-Stakes Nuclear Poker: How Pakistan\u2019s Deterrent Still Checks India\u2014Even After Operation Sindoor<\/a><\/ins><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even Pakistan\u2019s highest-ranking four-star military officer \u2013 the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), tasked with tri-service coordination \u2013 has almost always been from the Army. Since the post was created in 1976, there have been only two exceptions: a three-star PN officer in 1988 and a similarly ranked PAF officer in 1994, each serving for three-year stints. From 1997, however, the CJCSC\u2019s role has remained firmly within the Army\u2019s domain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) \u2013 responsible for the command, control, and oversight of Pakistan\u2019s nuclear arsenal and strategic forces \u2013 has, since its inception in 2000, always been headed by a three-star Army officer. Although structured as a tri-service body, the SPD reflects the Army\u2019s belief that nuclear weapons are an extension of its conventional deterrence posture vis-\u00e0-vis India. Consequently, the PAF\u2019s and PN\u2019s strategic assets report to the Army-run SPD, further reinforcing its overarching authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Army\u2019s influence extends well beyond the battlefield.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It controls sprawling business conglomerates such as the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Frontier Works Organisation, and National Logistics Cell. These entities operate extensive commercial ventures across sectors including real estate, housing, highway construction, mining, and food production including sugar and cereals \u2013 dominating large segments of Pakistan\u2019s economy and retail markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Proficiency over boots on the ground<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Critics argue that these ventures blur the lines between military and civilian economy, as these conglomerates enjoy tax exemptions and preferential treatment. Retired Army officers often secure lucrative post-retirement jobs in them and though created as soldier welfare schemes, these concerns now play an indispensable role in Pakistan\u2019s economy.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, the PAF and PN run relatively modest, welfare-oriented ventures. The PAF\u2019s Shaheen (Falcon) Foundation engages in limited real estate and healthcare services, while the PN\u2019s Bahria Foundation operates schools, and colleges, and provides restricted port and ship management services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Operationally, the PN has an even lower domestic profile than the PAF. Despite its growing relevance under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), it has historically remained on the margins of national defense priorities, receiving limited funding for modernisation. Its posture remains largely defensive \u2013 focused on protecting Pakistan\u2019s 1,000-odd km coastline and ensuring regional deterrence rather than projecting power. Efforts to build a credible sea-based second-strike nuclear capability have also progressed slowly due to financial constraints and political inertia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike the Army, the PAF and the PN have never cultivated political or media patronage networks, further marginalising their individual or dual influence over national security policy. Their role in shaping debates on national development, crisis management, and foreign policy is negligible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For, without a standing presence in urban centres, no history of counter-insurgency dominance, and no tanks or infantry brigades near the capital, both services were structurally incapable of executing a coup or enforcing martial law. Politics in Pakistan demands boots on the ground \u2013 something the PAF and PN can never provide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The two services have traditionally prided themselves on their technocratic ethos, shaped by selective recruitment and an emphasis on specialised proficiency and operational capability, and \u2013 in the PAF\u2019s case \u2013 aerospace innovation, rather than political engineering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was further reinforced by their broad-based and inclusive recruitment across Pakistan\u2019s four provinces, unlike the Army, which has historically drawn disproportionately from Punjab and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, the fallout from Op Sindoor has exposed fractures within the upper echelons of Pakistan\u2019s military due to the PAFs display of accuracy and innovation \u2013 and its (as yet unconfirmed) claim of five Indian kills.  And while there is no visible conflict, the PAF\u2019s operational significance and the Army\u2019s apparent lapses, are fostering a silent struggle for influence in Pakistan\u2019s military, especially over the national security narrative and execution of hi-tech warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 But matters could change if the PAF continues to outperform the Army in high profile operations, advances its technological partnerships with China, and cultivates influence among civilians or within policymaking circles, it could well secure a stronger institutional voice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reference Link:- https:\/\/thewire.in\/security\/operation-sindoor-pakistan-air-force-military-balance-army<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, the Pakistan Air Force has emerged with newfound operational credibility, eclipsing the Pakistan Army\u2019s traditional dominance for the first time in decades. With cutting-edge electronic warfare, AI-enabled capabilities, and Chinese support, the PAF\u2019s performance has reignited internal debates on civil-military balance, strategic control, and institutional relevance \u2013 marking a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":19801,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[2],"tags":[132,105,19197,14210,39,19195,17935,4496,19194,36,3299,19196],"class_list":["post-19800","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-sample-category","tag-economy","tag-geopolitics-2","tag-https-thewire-in-security-operation-sindoor-pakistan-air-force-military-balance-army","tag-iaf","tag-india","tag-india-defeated","tag-india-pakistan-war","tag-paf","tag-paf-established-its-supermacy","tag-pakistan","tag-pakistan-air-force","tag-performance-of-paf"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19800","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=19800"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19800\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":19802,"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19800\/revisions\/19802"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/19801"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=19800"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=19800"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gsrra.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=19800"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}